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Abstract
Since the end of the Cold War, the practice of defence diplomacy has received 
much attention, as has the proactive prevention of conflict. However, the preventive 
diplomacy of defence forces – something that is implied in the literature – has been 
less well articulated. This article addresses the theoretical lacuna by means of a pivotal 
qualification: the conceptual demarcation is narrowed down to non-coercive defence 
diplomacy (NCDD). NCDD is based on the principles of transparency, reputation and 
integrity and, per definition, it eschews violence or the threat thereof. It is therefore an 
exclusive subset of the wide range of international defence cooperation (generically 
referred to as ‘defence diplomacy’) in which defence forces engage. When NCDD 
activities are synchronised with the early stages of conflict development, the escalation 
of conflict is avoided. This is because NCDD requires of defence forces to conduct 
their cooperative international relations in a manner that promotes confidence and 
trust: essential elements of security that are integral to sustainable peace. Within the 
realm of diplomatic statecraft, the potential agency of defence forces in the prevention 
of conflict therefore warrants more strategic attention. It is especially required in 
Africa, where stable peace remains elusive and post-colonial military influence in 
intra- and inter-state politics has been mostly problematic. 
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Introduction
In the 21st century, there is a global trend for government institutions to be more 
accountable and transparent to the publics they serve. Defence forces – whose agency 
is the primary focus of this article – are no different. A significant number of them are 
transforming to meet the exigencies of the changing international environment, and to 
achieve their raison d’être better, namely to protect their states from violent conflict.
The resolution of conflict is an interdisciplinary concern in the humanities, and its 
management is a global imperative. This preoccupation reflects in both military and 
diplomatic instruments of foreign policy. The link has always been there: diplomats 
negotiating the beginning and ending of wars, and military commanders morphing into 
astute diplomats. It is not a new phenomenon for foreign policy actors to incorporate 
military elements into diplomatic processes, nor is it unheard of for defence forces to 
use diplomacy. As a result and across the world, the military–diplomacy relationship 
features prominently in policies and strategies of defence forces. 
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 47, Nr 1, 2019. doi: 10.5787/47-1-1267
56
In this regard, defence forces also practice ‘preventive diplomacy’. The latter 
term was presaged in Article 99 of the United Nations (UN) Charter, but for the 
duration of the Cold War, the concept was not fleshed out, either in theory or in 
practice. Subsequently, new approaches in security studies emphasised human rather 
than state security and transcended the traditional conceptualisation of international 
security. Changes in the nature of war, notably the preponderance of intractable, 
intrastate conflicts with regional spill-over, made it necessary to avoid myopic, linear 
approaches to conflict resolution. 
The more holistic and longer-term consideration of conflict management brought 
to the fore the necessity for proactive prevention of conflict. It was eloquently 
addressed in Egyptian statesman Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 “Agenda for Peace”, 
prepared at the start of his term as UN Secretary-General. Boutros-Ghali defined 
preventive diplomacy as “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to 
prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the 
latter when they occur”.200
In the ensuing decades, preventive diplomacy received much attention, but the role 
of defence forces has been less well articulated. Indeed, the conceptual underpinnings 
of the defence–diplomacy conflict prevention nexus are under-researched and under-
theorised. The utility of defence diplomacy is not in question; what is unclear is how (in 
a descriptive-analytical sense) and when (in an exploratory sense) defence diplomacy 
can contribute to conflict prevention. A more nuanced approach to defence diplomacy 
requires examination of the life cycle of conflict in order to extract conceptual 
markers for the timing and nature of proactive strategy, including the development of 
confidence-building measures (CBMs) prior to the onset of violent conflict.
The study on which article is based addressed the theoretical lacuna in the literature 
by means of a pivotal qualification. The conceptual demarcation was narrowed down 
to non-coercive defence diplomacy (NCDD). Excluded from the discussion will 
be conflict management processes, such as deterrence, threats and armed coercion, 
even if these are accepted measures used by defence forces to suppress, regulate and 
limit conflict. Very little substantive research on NCDD specifically is evident in the 
literature. 
Our perspective is not exclusively Afro-centric, but it is influenced by the realities 
of our continent, which is beset by unresolved conflict. Post-colonial Africa has 
experienced significant militarisation of national politics and, as democratisation 
gains traction around the continent, it is essential that the dynamic presence and 
resources of defence forces be channelled into a positive new direction – that of 
conflict prevention. Conflict prevention has manifested in a few cases at domestic 
level, such as –
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•	 South Africa during its first democratic elections in 1994; 
•	 Egypt during the Arab Spring of 2011; 
•	 Zimbabwe during 2017 when Robert Mugabe was forced from power; and 
•	  both Algeria and Sudan in 2019, during civil society challenges to autocratic 
presidencies.
There is however much potential for the diplomacy of defence forces to play a 
wider, inter-state role in the prevention of conflict. 
The aim of our article is to explain the nexus between defence diplomacy 
and conflict prevention with a pertinent focus on NCDD. The article begins by 
explaining the context of defence diplomacy. We question the intuitive assumption 
that defence diplomacy is intrinsically non-coercive, and explicitly draw a distinction 
between coercive defence diplomacy and NCDD within a conflict prevention 
setting. This is followed by an analysis of conflict prevention, with reference to the 
conflict development model proposed by Christopher Mitchell.201 This is done in 
order to identify the link and relationship between NCDD activities – collectively 
operationalised as confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) – and 
how these potentially contribute to conflict prevention, together with an analytical 
framework. Our article concludes with three key findings concerning the utility and 
agency of NCDD in the prevention of conflict. 
Defence, as diplomacy 
In the contemporary era, diplomacy is undertaken by most government 
departments in support of shaping and implementing foreign policy.202 Defence 
ministries are a case in point, and their de facto diplomacy at international level has 
become known as ‘defence diplomacy’. According to Gregory Winger, the term was 
first used by the British government during the 1990s, but it is not a recent practice.203 
At bureaucratic–institutional level, the French introduced the attachment of military 
personnel to diplomatic missions in the Napoleonic period, during the early 1800s. 
They did so in order to monitor military developments in their host countries, and 
the utility of the practice soon saw it emulated by other European countries.204 It took 
much longer, however, for the term ‘defence diplomacy’ to assume prominence in 
the international relations and military lexicon. This only happened during the 1990s, 
when defence forces across the world had to re-examine their roles in the nascent 
post-Cold War world order. The most obvious change was a shift away from a narrow 
focus on forging alliances against a common enemy to a wider mission of improving 
relations with former or potential enemies.205
Defence diplomacy found particular traction among member states of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in response to the profound change in defence 
relations with former communist states in Eastern Europe. From their side, Warsaw 
Pact countries were also attempting to normalise defence relations with former 
adversaries. These changes, and defence forces’ novel role in establishing relationships 
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based on trust and mutual confidence, have not been limited to Europe. In Asia and 
Latin America (and Africa, but to a lesser extent), defence ministries have played key 
roles in promoting civil–military relations and implementing security sector reform in 
post-conflict states and states in democratic transition. Peacekeeping, peacebuilding 
and post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) incorporate multilateral 
defence diplomacy as an adjunct to bilateral defence relations. 
Multilateral defence relations have also become a hallmark of regional 
integration projects. Within the catchment area of the European Union (EU), the 
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and other regional organisations, defence 
ministries have pooled military strategy and institutionalised the type of regular trans-
governmental interaction that was previously the exclusive mandate of diplomats. 
Regional institutionalisation of defence diplomacy improves the management of 
regional relations more generally, and at a grassroots level, promotes the sharing 
of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) efforts and Peace Support 
Operations (PSO). 
Based on their assessment of the contribution of defence to Southeast Asia’s 
regional security architecture, Tan and Singh cite the example of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) regional defence forums and institutions.206 These 
include the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA), ASEAN’s Defence Ministers’ 
Meeting (ADMM) and the ADMM-Plus.207 The various associations provide strategic 
depth to ASEAN’s broader policies, afford constructive engagement among member 
states, and facilitate collective understanding of the strategic cultures that feed into 
the regional project.
In Africa, the regional integration of defence relations has been a Pan-Africanist 
ideal since Kwame Nkrumah advocated for an ‘African High Command’ in the 
late 1950s. Yet, at a practical level, this has not materialised. The Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) was notoriously ineffectual in matters of conflict resolution, 
and its successor, the African Union (AU), has since its inception in 2002 struggled 
to capacitate the various components of its African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA). The most successful institutionalised defence cooperation on the continent 
occurs in West Africa, where the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) has presided over several successful peace processes in the region. A 
recent example is its January 2017 intervention in The Gambia. Following decades of 
rapacious authoritarian rule, civilian anger erupted after incumbent President Jammeh 
refused to accept electoral defeat. With civil war seemingly imminent, ECOWAS 
launched ‘Operation Restore Democracy’, and promptly restored order in the country, 
after which the regional body oversaw (as it continues to do) a peaceful constitutional 
transition. 
At global level, the proliferation in multilateral defence diplomacy has underlined 
the sheer scope and complexity of challenges to state security that have emerged 
over recent decades. In the process, defence ministries across the world have been 
compelled to widen and deepen their practice of defence diplomacy. However, the 
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vagaries of the concept have become problematic. Winger cautions that it “not only 
lacks a meaningful definition, but has been contorted and stretched to the extent that 
it is now both descriptively vacuous and analytically hollow”.208 The contemporary 
allure of defence diplomacy therefore risks its depiction as “an expedient catchall 
label”.209
In order to ensure a balanced assessment of defence diplomacy, its generic 
meaning must be distilled by means of an additional typology. The essence of this 
typology is to question the intuitive assumption that defence diplomacy is intrinsically 
non-coercive, and therefore to draw an explicit distinction between coercive defence 
diplomacy and NCDD within a conflict prevention setting.
A coercive–non-coercive dichotomy is implied when the qualifying adjective is 
used in strategy documents. South African official policy documents, for instance, 
explicitly use the concept ‘non-coercive defence diplomacy’.210 To this effect, in 2011, 
the Defence Secretariat Plan identified for the first time the use of military instruments 
non-coercively and as a “particular type of qualitative defence diplomacy”.211 
However, the policy documents do not explain why this qualification is necessary, 
how the two variations might differ, or what the link is to conflict prevention. The 
distinction therefore requires further clarification.
In a conventional sense, it could be argued that defence-as-diplomacy is 
intrinsically non-coercive and nothing else. The problem is that security literature 
abounds with references to ‘coercive diplomacy’, which conjures up the idea of a 
terminological extension into the realm of ‘coercive defence diplomacy’.212 Coercive 
diplomacy involves the pursuit of diplomatic objectives through communication of 
threats, even the limited use of force. Even so, for many diplomatic scholars, the 
concept is problematic because it implies a unilateral and aggressive foreign policy. 
Coercive Diplomacy therefore deviates from the essentially pacific and reciprocal 
nature of diplomacy. This is why See Seng Tan prefaces his chapter on military 
diplomacy with the caution, “[m]ilitary diplomacy has often been described as an 
oxymoron. Militaries exist to wage wars or deter them by force whereas diplomacy 
involves the use of negotiation and dialogue to achieve national goals.”213 In similar 
vein, Calvet de Magalhães insists on theorising diplomacy as opposed to any 
semblance of military force – the two options serving as extremes on a continuum of 
foreign policy instruments.214 For Calvet de Magalhães, as for many other scholars, 
coercive diplomacy is an incongruous construct, a contradiction in terms, which blurs 
conceptual parameters and professional mandates. 
To add to the confusion, scholars differ (as do governments) in their 
conceptualisation of defence diplomacy. Often, the phrase ‘military diplomacy’ is used 
instead. Tan says that, while a distinction between defence and military diplomacy 
should be maintained, the lines are becoming so blurred that it is difficult to draw a 
clear boundary between the two.215 Indian scholar Raja Mohan makes a more attractive 
distinction, defining military diplomacy as “interaction and exchanges between the 
uniformed services”.216 Defence diplomacy, on the other hand, is a broader and more 
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inclusive concept. According to Mohan, it amounts to “activities undertaken by the 
entire defence establishment, including its civilian bureaucracy and the research and 
development establishments”. 217As such, defence diplomacy refers to the practice 
whereby any member of a defence establishment who has official contact with a 
counterpart, defence institution or international organisation, establishes, broadens 
or deepens defence relations, including preventive diplomacy, in support of foreign 
policy objectives. Based on the aforesaid and for the purpose of this article, the over-
arching and broader concept – that of defence diplomacy – will be used.
In practice, defence diplomacy “runs the gamut from the significant to the 
mundane” as Jim Rolfe suggests.218 Included here are –
•	 bilateral and multilateral contacts between military and civilian officials; 
•	  the appointment of defence attachés to serve in diplomatic missions (or 
their secondment to multilateral organisations); 
•	 the conclusion of defence cooperation agreements; 
•	 the training of defence and civilian personnel; 
•	 the provision of expertise and advice on defence-related matters; 
•	 the conduct of ship visits and other military-related exchanges; 
•	 the staging of training exercises; and 
•	 the provision of military equipment and technical expertise.219 
Proponents of defence diplomacy, such as Cottey and Forster, suggest that 
it supports political commitments for cooperation, fosters common interests, 
promotes cooperation between defence forces, and demonstrates transparency to 
limit misunderstandings.220 We posit that the net result of these actions is conflict 
prevention, provided such actions are non-coercive and synchronised with conflict 
development, as we will discuss in due course. 
As can be expected, there are detractors as well. Nick Bisley cautions that 
defence diplomacy has limitations in regions such as Asia, which are characterised by 
entrenched political cleavages.221 
At domestic level, there are also many pitfalls that need to be avoided or managed 
with prudence. In her assessment of the 1998 United Kingdom (UK) Strategic Defence 
Review (SDR), Alice Hills identifies the flaws of defence diplomacy, in particular its 
linkages to Security Sector Reform (SSR).222 She emphasises that successful defence 
diplomacy must be integrated with programmes of other government departments 
and with other policy instruments for conflict resolution. If this is not done, defence 
diplomacy can be a source of friction between government departments over 
competition for scarce resources.223 Peter Leahy points out that defence diplomacy is 
time-consuming while not always yielding results,224 while Brendan Taylor cautions 
that its benefits are nebulous and difficult to quantify.225 At another angle, Hugh White 
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dismisses the concept as little more than a public relations exercise by defence forces 
to reassure society of their security during times of peace. He rejects outright the 
notion that military officers might resolve complex international political problems, 
i.e. presume to practice diplomacy simply through “soldierly plain-speaking”.226 
However, not all theorists hold such puritanical views of (defence as) diplomacy. 
Anton du Plessis argues that diplomacy is a vehicle for communicating and 
facilitating the full range of foreign policy actions: political, economic, cultural as 
well as military.227 He explains that when diplomacy is used in a military context, 
its techniques could range from non-coercive to coercive in the situational context 
of both cooperation and conflict. The idea of ‘smart power’ – a strategic fusion of 
hard and soft power, as articulated by Joseph Nye – aligns with this more malleable 
interpretation of diplomacy.228 
Nevertheless, coercive diplomacy is widely seen as a high-risk policy option that 
may have unintended consequences, and its utility in averting an escalation of conflict 
or achieving a de-escalation in existing levels of conflict, is limited.229 By extension, 
it can be deduced that ‘defence as diplomacy’ has restricted efficacy when it manifests 
as coercive defence diplomacy. The alternative, NCDD, therefore deserves special 
consideration in the context of conflict prevention. 
Conflict prevention 
According to Christopher Hill, conflict prevention is a “common thread which 
holds the (international) system together as it shows how interests and ideals can be 
yoked to each other”.230 Surprisingly, though, interpretations of conflict prevention 
are fraught with contestation. A precise definition is required in order to assess its 
“promise and limitations”, as Michael Lund observes, and to provide clarity for 
practical, coherent policy guidance.231
For the purpose of this article, conflict prevention is interpreted as ‘the prevention 
of an escalation to violent (i.e. involving the use of military force) confrontation’. 
It therefore occupies a very specific position in the broader context of conflict 
management. The assumption is not that (all) conflict can be eliminated. After 
all, conflict is an inevitable and pervasive human phenomenon. The challenge, as 
Chadwick Alger notes, is to develop procedures for distinguishing between disruptive 
(violent) conflict and constructive conflict.232 The timing and location of related 
activities are critically important; hence, the need for an early warning capacity to 
identify which conflicts have the potential to become violent, or to determine whether 
a particular conflict is moving towards a violent phase.233
The imperative of decisions on timing and opportunity in the course of proactive 
conflict management – conflict prevention, specifically – necessitates a closer look at 
the life cycle of conflict. Various studies have been done on the structure of conflict, 
with different descriptions of its development stages. Among them is Lund’s ‘life 
history of a conflict’ and the ‘hourglass model’ used by Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and 
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Miall to contextualise what they describe as “conflict transformation, settlement and 
containment”.234 We will, however, use Christopher Mitchell’s ‘conflict development 
model’, in which he demarcates the progression of conflict through three distinct 
stages: incipient, latent and manifest conflict.235 This model is particularly useful as it 
provides a purposive framework that permits the synchronisation of the conflict stages 
with the associated NCDD activities. 
A central theme in Mitchell’s analysis (as indeed in conflict studies, generally) is 
that of goal incompatibility. Divergent values and resource scarcity could ultimately 
lead to conflict, and the earliest stage in this process – an inchoate phase that 
Ramsbotham et al. describe as “the emergence of differences” – is referred to by 
Mitchell as “incipient conflict”.236 Without the benefit of hindsight, this stage could be 
difficult to diagnose, and even parties to the conflict might not recognise its existence. 
Consequently, incipient conflict is often ignored until there is escalation to a major 
catastrophe or widespread carnage.237 
Incipient conflict escalates when the parties consciously recognise their goal 
incompatibilities and begin to consider alternatives. This stage, which Mitchell labels 
“latent conflict”, does not necessarily have to be articulated or verbalised explicitly.238 
However, it is characterised by tension and suspicion and polarisation between the 
parties.239 Sporadic violence might take place, and parties typically ensure deterrent 
military capabilities at this stage, because they perceive one another as enemies.240
The third stage in the life cycle of conflict is what Mitchell refers to as “manifest 
conflict”.241 This occurs when a party takes identifiable action towards achieving its 
goals while simultaneously forcing the adversary to abandon or modify its behaviour. 
In this late stage of conflict, violence predominates and requires a different form of 
mitigation, namely conflict management. This involves limiting the spread of violence 
and bringing about a cessation in hostilities.242
For the purpose of this article, the first two stages of conflict, namely incipient 
and latent conflict, are the dominant albeit not the exclusive loci and foci of conflict 
prevention. The latitude for political and other options will decrease unless preventive 
action is taken, as Ramsbotham et al. maintain; hence, the positioning and alignment 
of conflict prevention with these development stages.243 
Based on and aligned with his conflict development model, Mitchell postulates that 
pre-manifest remedial actions constitute conflict avoidance during incipient conflict, 
and conflict prevention during latent conflict.244 From his perspective, the latter is 
found when conflict attitudes and perceptions over recognised goal incompatibility 
are addressed. Although explicitly directed at latent conflict, conflict prevention by 
implication focuses on the goal incompatibility that underlies the conflict situation 
and is therefore linked to incipient conflict. On the one hand, international conflict 
avoidance has preventive implications to the extent that it inhibits the development of 
widely shared, over-arching or ‘super-ordinate’ goals. Such goals not only preclude 
narrow interests but also increase cooperation amongst adversaries by uniting them 
around a common purpose.245 On the other hand, the avoidance of malign goal 
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 47, Nr 1, 2019. doi: 10.5787/47-1-1267
63
incompatibility is an act that prevents conflict from progressing to a new level or even 
entering a next cycle. Furthermore, the processes of conflict prevention do not restrict 
conflict to an incipient threshold but also extend it into the domain of latent conflict. 
At this point, it is important to note that incipient as well as latent conflict is 
part of what is now widely referred to as “negative peace”.246 The more nuanced 
conceptualisation of peace was introduced by Johann Galtung who observed that 
peace could not be defined simply as the absence of violent conflict.247 Even without 
overt violence, so-called ‘peace’ might be unstable (negative); hence, the compelling 
idea that stable (positive) peace needs to be nurtured or ‘built’. This imperative was 
emphasised in a June 2015 report by the UN High-Level Independent Panel on 
Peace Operations (HIPPO), which declares, “[p]eace processes do not end with a 
cease-fire, a peace-agreement or an election. Such events constitute merely a phase, 
rather than the conclusion, of a peace process. In fact, they may be times of great 
vulnerability”.248 The reoccurrence of violent conflict after peace agreements in South 
Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Côte 
d’Ivoire and Mozambique are just a few of the many examples of negative peace that 
has prevailed in Africa. 
The implication is that conflict does not necessarily develop in a linear manner. It 
could move through (potentially self-perpetuating) cyclical patterns, become dormant, 
diffuse into secondary proxy wars, or link into other conflicts. Conflict behaviour, 
a complex interplay of action and reaction, has a tendency to become increasingly 
harmful and coercive when parties ‘mirror-image’ each other’s actions. A related 
consideration is that conflict – despite its proclivity to escalate – does not always 
develop sequentially through all the identified stages. It could remain suppressed 
during the incipient or latent stages, and as Mitchell points out, manifest conflict might 
even be inhibited indefinitely as a result of an adversary’s overwhelming coercive 
power.249 Here the warning of Hill that preventing conflict during the incipient stage 
could suppress rather than resolve conflict should be kept in mind.250 On the other 
hand, restricting conflict to a pre-manifest stage could prevent its degeneration into a 
vortex of recurring violence. The development of conflict is affected by the emergence 
of new issues and involvement of new stakeholders, and these dynamics add to the 
complexity of conflict resolution. Moreover, conflict formations are interlinked, as 
Ramsbotham et al. point out.251 The ‘communicable’ nature of conflict means that 
local and regional conflicts almost invariably acquire an international profile, unless 
they are resolved timeously and comprehensively.
The non-linear nature of conflict development, and the fact that any stage of 
conflict could serve as roots for another conflict, explain why conflict prevention is 
part of post-conflict strategies as well. As Boutros-Ghali put it in his seminal Agenda 
for Peace, “the concept of peace-building as the construction of a new environment 
should be viewed as the counterpart of preventive diplomacy … preventive diplomacy 
is to avoid a crisis; post-conflict peace-building is to prevent a recurrence”.252 Incipient 
conflict can therefore reoccur after the ‘end’ of manifest conflict and in the wake of 
ostensible peace deals, if the peace that has been achieved, is negative.
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Boutros-Ghali made it clear that any reduction in the likelihood of conflict 
between states requires the creation of trust. This necessitates deliberate confidence 
building in situations where there is no shared understanding of the conflict. 
Prevention of conflict is based on identification of the causes of tension and suspicion, 
and implementation of appropriate responses to promote mutual interests.253 Positive 
incentives are of critical importance in preventive diplomacy, as Peter Jakobsen and 
Alexander George contend, and this implies the use of confidence-building measures 
to establish trust and certainty between parties to the conflict.254 This prevents intra- 
or interstate disputes from escalating into violence, and when escalation does occur, 
CBMs could limit the extent of violence.255
CBMs are specifically designed to modify behaviour. They are based on 
transparency and involve verifiable activities that establish predictable behaviour to 
prevent, manage and resolve crises that have the potential to escalate into violence.256 
The Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) in Europe, for example, 
makes extensive use of CBMs.257 The purpose is to avoid uncertainties among states, 
which might cause an intentional or unintentional escalation of hostilities. Related 
activities could be formal and informal; unilateral, bilateral and multilateral; military 
and political; and could be state-to-state as well as non-governmental activities.258
Siân Herbert distinguishes between two types of CBMs that prevent conflict 
escalation: military/security versus humanitarian, social and cultural.259 Both types, 
in line with the OSCE viewpoint, can be used in all phases of a conflict cycle.260 
Stefan Wolff cautions however that the use of CBMs is dependent on and therefore 
varies in accordance with the time frame.261 In the short term, they are designed to 
prevent conflict escalating into violence; in the medium term, they promote trust 
through increased contact; and in the long term, they pave the way for meaningful and 
sustainable conflict settlement. 
Several decades of theory building on conflict resolution have underlined, without 
contestation, the critical importance of prevention. Yet, as the HIPPO report points 
out, it “has not been sufficiently invested in”, even though “[t]he prevention of armed 
conflict is perhaps the greatest responsibility of the international community”.262 This 
is a deficiency in international organisations, as it is in individual states’ defence 
diplomacy. It is to the latter that we will now turn. 
Preventive defence diplomacy 
Defence diplomacy and conflict prevention interact against the backdrop of 
what Ronald Barston describes as “a complex and evolving” relationship between 
diplomacy and security.263 The utility value of defence diplomacy is that it forestalls 
countries from becoming adversarial. It does so by reducing tension, preventing issue 
escalation and facilitating information flow, which enhance mutual understanding 
of interests and capabilities.264 As discussed earlier, the idea of defence diplomacy 
implies both coercive and non-coercive activities. The coercive element can be 
detected in literature on preventive diplomacy also. Boutros-Ghali, for instance, 
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noted that preventive diplomacy requires CBMs as well as early warning (“based 
on information gathering and informal or formal fact-finding”), and added, “it may 
also involve preventive deployment and, in some situations, demilitarized zones”.265 
Lund builds on Boutros-Ghali’s thesis and widens the discussion on the recourse of 
preventive diplomacy to military options.266 He divides these military approaches and 
tools into two groups, namely “[r]estraints on the use of armed force” and “[t]hreat or 
use of armed force”. As part of the second category, he lists: 
•	 deterrence policies and security guarantees; 
•	 maintaining or restoring local or regional balances of power; and 
•	 the use or threat of limited force. 
It is clear that these options are essentially coercive, and therefore of limited 
utility for our analytical framework.
Lund’s first category, “[r]estraints on the use of armed force”, likewise includes 
some examples of defence actions that could be deemed coercive: the pre-emptive 
use of peacekeeping forces to deter and contain; demilitarised zones, safe havens and 
peace zones; as well as arms embargoes and blockades. On the other hand, he also 
includes options that are evidently non-coercive: 
•	 arms control regimes (including monitoring); 
•	 CBMs; 
•	 non-aggression agreements; 
•	 non-offensive force postures; and 
•	 military-to-military cooperation. 
Conducting defence diplomacy to prevent conflict from becoming violent 
requires the associated activities to take place “in vulnerable places and times”, i.e. 
during times of unstable peace.267 This implies that it should happen during the early 
(incipient and latent) stages of conflict. As soon as differences emerge, it is fitting 
to initiate activities, such as the establishment of military-to-military cooperation, to 
eliminate or mitigate differences. 
Considering the aims of defence diplomacy and to ensure that incipient conflict 
does not escalate into latent conflict (or that latent conflict does not escalate into 
manifest conflict), defence diplomacy activities must be synchronised with conflict 
development stages. Crucially, these activities must exhibit behaviour that –
•	 serves common interests; 
•	 supports mutual political commitments; 
•	 promotes cooperation in the defence environment; and 
•	 assists in modifying conflictual behaviour. 
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Key to this process is the mutual building of confidence. Activities must be geared 
towards eliminating differences and contradictions before polarisation occurs to 
address goal incompatibility and to encourage constructive behaviour and dialogue.268
When diplomacy is used in the context of CBMs to prevent conflict, it focuses on 
similarities rather than on differences, and in this way, misunderstandings are clarified 
and uncertainties are reduced. Against the backdrop of defence cooperation, when 
CBMs involve security-related activities, which build confidence, they are referred to 
as confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). CSBMs continue to be used 
with varying degrees of success to defuse tension and reduce the potential for violent 
conflict. Their use has been instrumental in reducing the potential for conflict between 
nuclear power rivals India and Pakistan, inter alia over Kashmir and the Siachen 
Glacier; and to reduce tension and prevent an ‘accidental’ escalation in the use of 
force between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its nemesis, Taiwan.269 
Most defence forces undertake activities to promote defence cooperation with 
selected partner states. Since these activities fall outside the realm of warfare and 
combat operations, and mainly take place during periods of relative peace and stability, 
they can be construed and operationalised collectively as CSBMs. Included are: 
•	 entering into formal agreements; 
•	 conducting joint combat simulation exercises; 
•	 providing training; 
•	 high-level, working and ship visits; 
•	 holding seminars; 
•	 intelligence exchanges and early warning information dissemination; 
•	 establishing common doctrine and procedures; 
•	 deploying defence attachés; 
•	 procuring or supplying armaments and technology; 
•	 providing HADR; 
•	 sports and cultural exchanges; and 
•	 even prisoner exchanges. 
Similarly, the OSCE also operationalises the following categories of what it terms 
‘CSBMs’: 
•	 annual exchange of information; 
•	 defence planning; 
•	 risk reduction; 
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•	 military contacts; 
•	 prior notification of certain military activities; 
•	  observation of military activities, such as land, air and naval exercises when 
the force level exceeds 13 000 troops; 
•	 the exchange of annual calendars of military activities; 
•	  constraining provisions, such as placing a limit on the number and sizes of 
exercises by countries; 
•	 measures to ensure compliance with and verification of the provisions; 
•	  regional measures for security cooperation, such as agreements that promote 
transparency; and 
•	 reducing the risk of military conflict.270 
In this respect, Lund concurs that CBMs are among a number of military tools to 
prevent conflict.271 Similarly, Ackermann is of the opinion that CBMs have specific 
utility in what she terms “operational or structural prevention”.272 
Not all commentators consider confidence building to be part of defence 
diplomacy. For instance, Cottey and Forster state, “[a]rms control, non-proliferation 
and confidence building do not fit within the definition of defence diplomacy.”273 
In contrast, the Indonesian Ministry of Defence identifies CBMs as central to their 
conceptualisation of defence diplomacy, particularly for bilateral and multilateral 
engagement.274 This validates the notion that defence diplomacy can be utilised for 
building confidence.275 When used non-coercively, defence diplomacy not only builds 
confidence but also contributes to conflict prevention. 
At policy formulation level, several states have ventured into the defence 
diplomacy–conflict prevention nexus. Justin Fris recounts how, in 1993, the 
Australian Minister of Defence linked the need to engage regional nations, maintain 
relations with alliances, and confirm a commitment to international peace and 
security to Australian defence.276 In 1994, the German Ministry of Defence went a 
step further and recognised that ‘military-political’ cooperation with former Warsaw 
Pact countries was a core mission to detect and resolve conflict before it escalated 
to military confrontation.277 Defence diplomacy similarly featured as a core mission 
in the UK’s 1994 SDR in which it was defined as the provision of “forces to meet 
the varied activities undertaken by the Ministry of Defence to dispel hostility, build 
and maintain trust and assist in the development of democratically accountable 
armed forces, thereby making a significant contribution to conflict prevention and 
resolution”.278
Canada followed the example of the United Kingdom by adopting defence 
diplomacy as official policy in 2005, describing it as a defence tool for shaping the 
international environment to contribute to stability by building relations.279 In the 
2012 Spanish defence diplomacy plan, defence diplomacy is described as –
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The various international activities based mainly on dialogue and 
cooperation, carried out bilaterally by the Ministry of Defence 
with our allies, partners and other friendly countries to promote the 
accomplishment of defence policy objectives in support of Spanish 
foreign policy.280 
These international activities comprise security sector reform, reinforcing security 
and defence capabilities, and – notably – conflict prevention. Whereas Canada and 
Australia are ambivalent about the nexus, the United Kingdom and Spain specifically 
link defence diplomacy to conflict prevention. The comprehensive description 
thereof by Germany, as earlier mentioned, emphasises the importance of detecting 
and resolving conflict before it escalates and places former enemies foremost in the 
integrated military-political context. 
Nevertheless, Sidney Bearman warns that it is “naïve” or “misleading” to suggest 
that conflict could be prevented by military-to-military contacts built through defence 
diplomacy, as today’s friend may be tomorrow’s foe.281 Bilateral and multilateral 
defence diplomacy and related activities can be used for preventing conflict but not in 
isolation from the political and foreign policy objectives of a government. To be sure, 
defence diplomacy is not an all-encompassing panacea for preventing conflict, as its 
utility is restricted to defence-related areas. While defence diplomacy has a general 
connotation, its utility in conflict prevention must be conceptually elucidated. 
An analytical framework for non-coercive defence diplomacy as conflict 
prevention 
A few authors have explicitly linked defence diplomacy and conflict prevention. 
Rolfe is of the opinion that, because defence diplomacy develops trust and enhances 
constructive relationships, it also contributes to conflict prevention and resolution.282 
Based on a wider conceptualisation, Du Plessis provides a framework that 
contextualises the use of defence diplomacy as part of peace strategies and conflict 
prevention.283 Hence, Rolfe and Du Plessis agree that defence diplomacy is used for 
conflict prevention, to the extent that it is non-belligerent, pacific-persuasive, grounded 
in trust, based on common interests and constructive relationships, transparent, and 
inclined to defence reform and cooperation. Some facets of this nexus, however, must 
be articulated emphatically to indicate how and when defence diplomacy contributes 
to peace and prevents cycles of violent conflict. 
Defence diplomacy for preventing conflict manifests at various levels and in 
a number of ways. The utility of these levels and ways lies in allaying fears and 
suspicions of former or potential enemies that have their origins in historical 
perceptions, political differences or tangible disputes, such as territory or maritime 
zones.284 This means that defence diplomacy, in a bilateral or multilateral mode, must 
be coordinated and employed at strategic, operational and tactical level when dealing 
with and preventing conflict. The suggested framework (see Table 1) has preventive 
diplomacy as its primary point of departure. Accordingly, defence diplomacy is 
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 47, Nr 1, 2019. doi: 10.5787/47-1-1267
69
positioned as a means (i.e. a particular type of diplomacy) within the process of 
preventive diplomacy. In addition, the emphasis is specifically on NCDD during 
periods of pre-manifest (incipient and latent) conflict, although with the inclusion of a 
qualified preventive role in respect of manifest conflict. 
In this respect, NCDD establishes, nurtures and expands defence ties to change 
conflict situations, attitudes or behaviour to engender trust and confidence, and it 
relies on the will of the parties to acknowledge and resolve differences associated 
with pre-manifest conflict. Nevertheless, NCDD is not without preconditions. First, 
emotional orientation towards partners and allies must be trusting, pacific, credible, 
collaborative and transparent. Second, discordant goals are inevitable in international 
relations implying that NCDD using confidence-building to modify behaviour must 
be ongoing. In essence, NCDD calls for pragmatism rather than idealism. NCDD 
cannot be used in all circumstances – it is not a blanket solution, it does not replace 
coercive defence diplomacy, and it is unlikely to be effective when there are deep and 
entrenched political differences between states. 
As an over-arching concept, NCDD can therefore play a role by altering conflict 
perceptions, reducing aggression and resentment while the deliberate use of CSBMs 
could reduce mistrust and suspicion. In the context of defence diplomacy responses 
and activities, CSBMs are classified into five sequential categories, namely bilateral 
and multilateral dialogue; the conclusion of agreements; information exchange; 
establishing defence ties at diplomatic level; and providing tangible substance to 
undertakings by participating in defence cooperation programmes. It is nonetheless 
of crucial importance that activities in support of NCDD be synchronised to prevent 
disputes from arising before conflict intensifies and becomes violent. This means 
that specific activities are used at specific times and at specific levels for specific 
purposes, as represented in Table 1 as a concept-based framework for linking NCDD 
and conflict prevention.
NCDD has its primary utility during incipient and latent conflict; hence, the need 
for a uniquely designed early warning system that focuses on the indicators of both. 
NCDD therefore adopts two approaches that follow in sequence to mitigate incipient 
and latent conflict. The first is conflict avoidance, which is intended to keep levels 
incipient; and the second is conflict prevention, which is intended to keep levels latent 
(or to reduce it to the incipient level). 
Conflict avoidance during the incipient stage primarily focuses on establishing 
defence ties, starting at the highest level and deepening the ties to functional levels. 
The purpose is to build relationships both formally and informally in bilateral and 
multilateral environments. Horizontal networks are established as a foundation, where 
possible drawing on historical commonalities. (France does this masterfully, as is 
evident from its extensive defence-related influence in the African Francophonie.) 
Hegemony and domination are deliberately avoided as these are at odds with non-
coercion, which emphasises building trust and credibility. A particular activity during 
this stage is joint NCDD research and training, especially in a regional context, as 
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this maximises the use of scarce resources and also fosters common approaches to 
avoiding conflict and embedding shared values.
Relations are deepened for preventing conflict during the latent stage, specifically 
using CSBMs to modify behaviour by orientating defence forces towards collaboration 
and cooperation. In this way, meaning and substance are given to the relationships 




Incipient conflict: conflict is largely subliminal and the parties might even be unaware of its imminence. However, there are 
vestiges of goal incompatibility.












Non-coercive defence diplomacy (NCDD)
Discordant goals are inevitable in international relations implying that NCDD using confidence building to modify behaviour is 
ongoing. Activities must support political objectives, must not incite or stimulate incompatibility, must focus on congruency, and 
must ensure that behaviour remains within mutually agreed boundaries, which preclude violence.
Non-coercive defence diplomacy conflict approaches
Pre-manifest conflict stages
The incipient conflict stage The incipient conflict stage
Conflict avoidance Conflict prevention
Relations are established with the defence 
forces of partner countries and organisations 
to prevent an escalation from incipient to 
latent conflict. Related NCDD activities 
are aimed at: 
•	 identifying goal incompatibility or 
emerging differences;
•	 identifying and pursuing complementary 
goals;
•	 establishing common values and 
interests;
•	 pursuing broader objectives of 
cooperation and trust;
•	 supporting mutual political 
commitments;
•	 ensuring expectations regarding 
cooperation are kept within reasonable 
limits;
•	 promoting transparency by revealing 
intent and capability;
•	 allaying aggression, mistrust and 
suspicion;
•	 changing perceptions concerning 
defence activities that may be construed 
as belligerent;
•	 using prevention to keep incipient 
conflict within acceptable levels 
according to agreed parameters; and
•	 eschewing coercion as an alternative to 
prevent a maligned conflict spiral. 
In support of the above, it is essential 
during this (incipient) stage to establish a 
foundation for NCDD that concentrates 
on defence diplomacy research and 
training. It can be conducted bilaterally and 
multilaterally to develop common doctrine 
regarding NCDD for conflict prevention. 
It can also be pitched at an epistemic level 
by facilitating revolving-door exchanges 
between the defence force and research 
institutions  or think tanks that specialise in 
defence diplomacy and conflict prevention 
Relationships with the defence forces of partner countries and organisations 
are further broadened and deepened using CSBMs to modify behaviour. The 
purpose is to maintain conflict in its pre-manifest stages. 
Activities associated with defence diplomacy in a non-coercive mode include a 
combination of the following:
 
Bilateral and multilateral defence dialogue 
•	 conducting high level and working visits;
•	 servicing and monitoring defence cooperation agreements; and
•	 establishing and participating in formal structures for bi- and multilateral 
defence consultations at regional, continental and international level.
 
Bilateral and multilateral defence agreements
Deliberating, agreeing, concluding, signing and ratifying: 
•	 memoranda of understanding (MOU) on defence cooperation;
•	 nonaggression agreements;
•	 arms control agreements (including monitoring); and mechanisms for 
dispute resolution.
 
Defence-related information exchange 
Facilitating information flow concerning early warning. Early warning in this 
sense requires a unique approach as it is directed at identifying the indicators 
of incipient and latent conflict rather than the manifestation of violent conflict. 
Because of the sensitivity of information exchange, the creation of suspicion 
and hostility must be carefully avoided. All efforts should be made to ensure –
•	 transparency in methodology; 
•	 clarity in terms of the mutual security agenda that is pursued; and 
•	 consensus concerning appropriate remedial action.
Establishing and maintaining defence ties at inter-governmental and intra-
governmental levels
•	 appointing defence attachés to strategically selected states and 
organisations; and
•	 appointing specialist advisors at national and sub-national level to other 
government departments and agencies. 
Conducting bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation programmes in 
support of agreements
•	 training defence and civilian personnel, including the deployment of 
training teams and other experts;
•	 providing military equipment and technical expertise;
•	 conducting ship visits and other military-related exchanges;
•	 conducting training exercises;
•	 joint patrolling and ceasefire monitoring;
•	 hosting cultural and sporting events;
•	 supporting HADR; and
•	 hosting conferences and seminars on issues of mutual interest.
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Conclusion
The study on which this article is based set out to explore, in the first instance, the 
idea of defence as diplomacy. The practice of de facto diplomacy by armed forces is 
gaining traction worldwide, and is fuelled by democratisation of intrastate as well as 
interstate politics. It is important to keep in mind, however, that within the hierarchy 
of foreign policy, the international relations of defence forces remain a subset 
of broader diplomatic statecraft. Diplomacy can be shored up with military threat 
(amounting to coercive diplomacy) but that particular diplomatic–military nexus is 
not the equivalent of defence forces employing diplomatic tools. In both instances, 
defence forces implement (rather than formulate) foreign policy. For the purpose of 
our research, we were particularly interested in the agency of defence forces, when the 
diplomatic goal is conflict prevention.
Three findings resulted from our theoretical contextualisation. The first is that the 
conceptual variables – defence diplomacy, conflict and its prevention, even the very 
notion of peace – are contested, and present a problem of definition. For descriptive-
analytical purposes, it was therefore necessary to settle on stipulative meanings and 
accounts. The second finding is that the defence diplomacy–conflict prevention 
nexus is seldom theorised as such, despite evidence in the literature of implicit links 
when one or the other is theorised. The third  ̶  and related to the second  ̶  is that 
defence diplomacy is not specifically theorised from a non-coercive perspective. 
Considering its assumed utility for preventing conflict, NCDD therefore required 
further clarification.
NCDD is based on the principles of transparency, reputation and integrity, and 
non-violent methods. It entails convincing, persuading, negotiating or behaving 
in a manner that serves common interests and values, it supports mutual political 
commitments and it promotes defence cooperation. As such, it focuses on former or 
potential adversaries (rather than on current opponents in an adversarial relationship) 
as well as on existing or potential allies and partners. NCDD is an alternative to the use 
of force and thus essentially different from coercive defence diplomacy. It establishes, 
nurtures and expands defence ties to change situations, attitudes and behaviour, and 
it engenders trust and confidence. These attributes bestow on NCDD distinct agency 
in conflict prevention. 
Conflict prevention denotes an element of timing, and therefore NCDD and its 
associated activities, specifically CSBMs, must be synchronised with the first two 
stages of conflict development, namely incipient and latent conflict. Ostensible peace 
can be negative (the continent of Africa is rife with examples!) and this means that 
NCDD is essential to safeguard incipient conflict from escalating into latent conflict, 
and inhibiting latent conflict from escalating into a manifest form. A conflict ‘climate 
change’ is thus effected through the elimination of differences and contradictions 
before polarisation occurs, or if polarisation has already taken place, through changing 
conflict attitudes, perceptions and behaviour, In summary, it can be deduced that when 
NCDD is used proactively during incipient or latent stages of conflict, it plays a role 
in promoting positive peace. 
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The scope and space available in this article did not allow for an in-depth study 
of the theoretical framework, and it is recommended that more research be done to 
determine the parameters and indicators of NCDD. The differences between and 
overlap of non-coercive and coercive defence diplomacy, the transition of the one 
to the other, and the implications of this transition should be examined, inter alia. 
Case study application is also essential. The topic has global application because, as a 
policy instrument, NCDD is accessible to all states, regardless of their relative power. 
This bestows on NCDD much potential as a tool of soft power. Middle powers, such 
as Canada, Sweden and South Africa, have carefully nurtured their soft power profile, 
and indeed their international identity, based on a conflict resolution track record.
From our own vantage point, the role of defence forces in Africa deserves special 
attention. These forces have been politically prominent (and often maligned) in the 
post-colonial dispensation, but their potential to prevent conflict is a largely untapped 
resource. The crafting of NCDD policy frameworks and investment in training to 
allow for its implementation are therefore essential. At a normative level, NCDD also 
resonates with the historically important integration agenda of the continent and its 
various sub-regions. This begs a much more vigorous research agenda than the current 
study. 
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